We discuss the impact of liberalisation, deregulation and the introduction of a single currency on cash management within multinationals in the euro zone. The developments in the euro zone reduce financial market imperfections in transferring cash and diminish the need for separate local cash holdings. This facilitates the centralisation of cash management and headquarters' financial control. Increased financial power of multinational headquarters, moreover, offers opportunities for disintermediation. By exploiting these options multinationals in the euro zone can start to reap additional benefits of internal financing and conglomerate discounts of euro zone multinationals may diminish. 
1
The euro zone is often considered to be the group of 12 countries within the European Community that introduces the euro as a single currency. These are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Moreover, smaller countries like Andorra, Monaco and Vatican City will also be using the euro and we include them in the euro zone. However, other countries or regions like Serbia and Kosovo that will switch from German marks to euros are not considered by us to be part of the euro zone. generate any return. Also bankruptcy costs come to the fore as a reason for cash holdings. If creditors are not paid in time, they may force the company into bankruptcy and the shareholders and managers try to avoid the concomitant costs.
In this paper we follow the latter approach. The developments within the euro zone have reduced market imperfections and we evaluate how these have affected cash management in multinationals. We add the context of a multinational, a firm that has operating subsidiaries in at least four countries, because major developments in 5 the financial markets of the euro zone have their impact across countries and do not only affect local companies. Moreover, multinationals are more complex than singlecountry companies and it is usual to find a corporate headquarter and local subsidiaries. Managers of local subsidiaries can be considered to be the agents of the board members at the multinational headquarter, while the board members in their turn are agents of the shareholders. In particular the agency relationships between local and headquarter managers is important here because the control of cash is a determinant in exercising power. Managers of local subsidiaries might like to keep as much cash as possible within their realm. According to Jensen (1986) , free cash (flows) may introduce agency costs. Moreover, the investment in cash, bank accounts and short term paper does not give high returns. For these reasons the value of the multinational may decline if unnecessary amounts of cash are left at the local level. In that case the internal financial market within the multinational is inadequate and the company may show a "conglomerate discount" when compared to a comparable set of stand-alone companies.
In section 2 we present the relevant theory. In section 3 we address the impact of liberalisation and deregulation on the financial choices available to multinationals. In section 4 we analyse the impact of the introduction of a single currency. In section 5 we present the concomitant developments of multinational cash management systems. In section 6 we discuss the implications of these changes for 6 headquarters' control and conglomerate discounts. Finally, section 7 provides the conclusions.
Conglomerate benefits or discounts
Multinationals being a sub-sample of conglomerates, the literature thereon is relevant here. Financial literature has been involved with the value of conglomerates for a long time. While diversification theory based on Markowitz (1952) suggested that a conglomerate could benefit from the reduction of total risk, further developments in risk theory (Sharpe, 1964) stressed that shareholders could diversify their portfolio themselves and that they did not need any help from the companies in which they invest. The formation of a conglomerate would not add value to the shareholders. For that reason finance theory has been searching for other benefits of amalgamated firms, and also for the disadvantages, because empirical evidence has shown that in general a take-over adds value only to the shareholders of the target firm.
One major study of the Beatrice company (Baker, 1992) revealed that the value of conglomerates may have changed over time. During the first part of the last century mergers benefited the participating companies because the conglomerate headquarter could add value. In particular financial, juridical, managerial knowledge and financial resources were scarce and a conglomerate could more easily apply these 7 scarce and valuable resources than single companies. However, business schools have made business knowledge available for many people and now, because that knowledge is less scarce, single companies can afford these knowledge resources too.
Moreover, the development of junk bonds has made it possible for knowledgeable outsiders to break up conglomerates if the performance of the conglomerate is inadequate. For these reasons single companies nowadays have opportunities which equal those of conglomerates. One can add that the knowledge resources of subsidiaries of a conglomerate may also have increased and that this has reduced the relative power of conglomerate headquarters.
If single companies or divisions are on an equal footing with conglomerates, one might ask why conglomerates still exist. A variety of reasons may come to the fore (Funk, 1999), but a major suggestion is that conglomerate financing and the internal reallocation of money across subsidiaries may have benefits. Stein (1997) , for example, suggests that a corporate headquarter may be better than an outside bank in finding winning investment opportunities and that, in this sense, a conglomerate headquarter can add value to a diversified firm. Scharfstein (1998), however, finds evidence that divisions in high potential industries tend to invest less than their stand alone industry peers, while the reverse is true for the low potential divisions. Also Shin and Stulz (1996) find that in general the conglomerate fails to allocate more funds to divisions in industries with better investment opportunities. Furthermore, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) show that diversified firms tend to trade at a 8 discount in comparison to comparable firms and that the discount is positively related to the extent of investment misallocation and the diversity of the investment opportunities across divisions. In particular when headquarter has limited power, funds may be allocated to the "wrong" investment projects. This is corroborated by Mudambi (1999) , who found that when a headquarter grants more power to subsidiaries, the functioning of the internal capital market will be hampered. Khanna and Tice (2001) , however, suggest that conglomerate discounts are mainly found within samples of unrelated diversifications. Conglomerates with unrelated subsidiaries have more problems with internal financing, than conglomerates where all subsidiaries are active in the same line of business. In the latter case there are less possibilities for managers of subsidiaries to misinform corporate headquarters on preferred local investment opportunities. Moreover, managers may be transferred more easily from one subsidiary to another and they may therefore be less inclined to favour their subsidiary with irrational investments.
Finally, Burch, Nanda and Narayanan (2000) suggest that conglomerate discounts are caused by the fact that mainly firms of lower quality prefer to participate in conglomerates.
Thus theory and empirical research on conglomerates, in general, suggest that lower quality companies in unrelated conglomerates with weak headquarters may be able to obtain financing for poor investments. In this paper we will suggest that the developments in the euro zone strengthen (and have strengthened) the power of 9 conglomerate headquarters and therefore may help (and have helped) to reduce the impact of conglomerate discounts.
Liberalisation, deregulation and financial transactions
In this section we discuss the impact on the choices available to multinationals of liberalisation and deregulation within the euro zone. Developments outside the euro zone that affected the developments within the euro zone (e.g. those within the European Union in general) will also be discussed. Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between parent companies and subsidiaries in different Member royalties, operational lease and interest payments in the European Union. Currently, further harmonisation of these withholding taxes throughout the EU is strived for, while corporate tax rates are already converging in the EU (Austin, 1999).
Because banking tariffs for intra-EU cash flow transfers were judged to be high throughout the EU (transactions often being charged twice; at both the payer and the receiver levels), the European Commission enforced legislation here as well 7 . As a result, European banking tariffs were reduced severely, but only gradually.
While financial liberalisation can be said to refer to the lifting of restrictions on international capital markets, financial deregulation refers to the same activity in domestic markets 8 . Previously, the domestic regulations were intended to prevent concentrations and distortions in the local financial systems. These regulatory frameworks, however, were both ineffective and inefficient (Friedman and Friedman, 1980) . Later deregula tion was aimed at free trade in all financial products and services, and at giving financial institutions a free choice on the location of their affiliates. Such deregulation has been facilitated by changing government attitudes and enforced by a number of Directives of the European Union 9 .
States -COM (90) forced European multinationals to finance themselves within the countries where these instruments were available. Now, all financing instruments are allowed in all the countries, and financial innovations in one country can be used in another country as well.
A single currency and market imperfections
The 
Centralisation and disintermediation
Typically, the cash management system of a multinational in the euro zone has traditionally been structured in a simple way. In every country where the company had substantial operating facilities, the treasury of the affiliate often largely did its own cash management (Soenen and Aggarwal, 1989; Tse and Westerman, 1997 ).
This was a rational approach because of the imperfections in the European capital markets. After liberalisation, deregulation and the introduction of a single currency, these market imperfections have diminished quite significantly along with the costs of centralising the finance function.
Centralisation
Centralisation offers various advantages (Kenyon et. al., 1992; Brown, 1997; Miles, 1997 Moreover, the benefits of internal financing may be more easily reaped, as the concentration of financial know-how helps to improve investment decision making.
There are, however, also various disadvantages. Local managers may lose the motivation to control cash flows adequately. When the cash management and finance functions are in the hands of headquarters, the co-ordination between the financial disciplines and the local knowledge may more easily be frustrated. Moreover, a centralised cash system requires a highly formalised cash balance control system, thus raising regulative, administrative and information costs. Rubber Company formally incorporated a European treasury centre in Luxembourg.
That treasury now provides access to capital markets, establishes and maintains bank relationships, manages currency exchange risk, develops intercompany transaction strategies, negotiates credit terms with banks, evaluates cash utilisation and establishes guidelines for SBU cash management, among others (Brown, 1997, p.
36). We expect that deregula tion and liberalisation as well as the introduction of the Euro may have helped to tip the balance in favour of centralisation and may still be continuing to do so.
Disintermediation
The form a cash management system takes is not only determined by internal characteristics. It also involves external relationships, in particular with banks and it is not surprising that European firms consider their relationship with a bank almost as important as banks' prices and service quality (Tse and Westerman, 1997).
The external relationships evolve with centralisation over time. First the banking system is used to collect receivables and to pay accounts. The relationship with the "house banks" is asymmetrical: the house bank provides a wide array of products that firms can use. Then the tendency may evolve to centralise cash management and the multinational will aim at processing efficiently the various financial transactions of the operational units. This may lead to a substantial decrease in the number of bank accounts, since little used accounts will be closed. The finance 18 department of a multinational will be starting to act as a purchasing unit and the relationships with banks will be loosened as "shopping" with other banks grows and financial knowledge at headquarters is enlarged.
Still later, the cash function within the multinational may develop into a corporate finance function that acts in balancing conflicting objectives like minimising tax and interest payments, reducing interest risks and providing liquidity.
Banks with international networks, know-how and information systems skills may then shift to providing services instead of products to such departments. In fact, some large financial institutions have picked up the recent trends, by expanding their services to more countries and by investments in sophisticated information systems to be used in the operation of European cash management systems.
Finally, the corporate finance function of a multinational may act as an inhouse b ank (Hagemann, 1991) . Such an in-house bank provides intracompany products and services by itself, issues short-term financial instruments like commercial paper, competes with other banks for the business of third-party customers and has thus become an equal partner for licensed banks. It will be clear that the aforementioned centralisation trend goes to the detriment of the intermediary function of banks. 
Headquarters' control and conglomerate discounts
The joint trends of centralising the cash function and of disintermediation will have their impact on the power of the multinational's headquarter. Centralisation will, generally, take place at headquarters, and may positively influence the power of headquarters with respect to cash management. As the headquarters' lack of power in financing and investing was a major reason for corporate discounts, the centralisation of cash management may reduce these discounts.
Headquarters' power may further increase with disintermediation. Firstly because fewer banks are involved and the bank that remains most relevant for the multinational will have its main ties with headquarters. Secondly, if the cash management function develops into a corporate finance function also external financing will be channelled through headquarters and then -again-the financial power of headquarters will increase. For these reasons, we expect that the liberalisation, deregulation and introduction of a single currency will improve the internal financing function and that conglomerate discounts will decrease.
However, not all multinationals will be able to centralise the cash function directly (Gruiters and Bergen, 1998) managed centrally at the corporate headquarter, it is not necessarily the case that also decisions on fixed assets will -or should-be centralised. Conglomerate discounts based on a lack of power of headquarters with respect to internal financing and investments will thus not vanish within all multinationals. Nevertheless, it is likely that the developments in the financial markets assist in reducing conglomerate discounts for some multinationals in the euro zone 13 .
Conclusions
Liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets as well as the introduction of the single currency in Europe will reduce transaction and bankruptcy costs for multinationals. This gives rise to two trends in Europe. Firstly, internal transfers of cash and the management of residual cash positions will become cheaper and easier.
Therefore, the centralisation of cash management activities gains attractiveness. This may even result into a full-fledged corporate finance function at headquarters.
Secondly, the centralisation will affect the relationship of multinationals with banks.
It is likely that the number of bank relations will be reduced, as more money is 13 Conglomerate discounts cannot solely be responsible for the comparable low price earnings ratios in most euro zone countries (Eiteman, Stonehill and Moffett, 2001 ), but our analysis suggests that deregulation, liberalisation and a single currency may increase these ratios into the direction of those of the United States.
managed internally within multinationals and that one major bank will provide most of the cash management services to the treasuries at multinationals' headquarters.
These trends will have an impact on the internal financing function of multinationals and if cash management is centralised, conglomerate discounts may diminish. Multinationals in the euro zone may benefit further if they also operate in countries that will join the European Union or the euro zone in the future. Because multinationals have different backgrounds and different reasons for empowering subsidiaries, the corporate discounts will not vanish completely.
Until now, academics have largely focused on cash management models and on cash management surveys. Our paper is different as we link the cash management function to mainstream theory of corporate finance. First we suggest that institutional changes within the euro zone have reduced market imperfections. Then we show that the reduction of these imperfections could trigger centralisation and disintermediation. Finally, we suggest that centralisation followed by disintermediation may improve the internal financing function within multinationals.
This may eventually diminish conglomerate discounts and improve the value of the multinational.
It is outside of the scope of this paper to answer the empirical question whether the centralisation of cash management is beneficial to multinationals.
Nevertheless, further empirical research might be interesting. In particular, it would be interesting to learn whether multinationals that centralise their cash management 22 function do indeed outperform in terms of value the comparable multinationals that did not. Our analysis not only suggests that centralisation creates value, but that the concomitant disintermediation adds value too. Researchers could therefore, also try to measure the amount of disintermediation and study its impact on conglomerate discounts. Of course, such research may create multicollinearity problems because disintermediation will be related to centralisation. Moreover, econometric simultaneity problems may arise: disintermediation is considered to create value, but at the same time higher valued companies may be better able to avoid banking products. Despite of these problems, we hope that our qualitative approach may not only trigger related theoretical but also empirical research.
